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1.  Introduction
A much-debated hypothesis about the Great Depression is Friedman and Schwartz's
(1963) contention that a severe but not unusual US recession turned into the greatest contraction
of all times because the Federal Reserve failed to undertake expansionary open-market operations.
They would have offset a drastic decline in the stock of money attributable to a series of banking
panics. Controversy about the role of monetary factors in causing the Great Depression in the US
was a feature of the earlier literature, but the consensus of the recent literature is that monetary
shocks (produced largely by a series of banking crises) played a major role in prolonging and
deepening the Great Depression.
1
International aspects of the Great Depression have also been the focus of attention in
recent studies.  Research on international experience shows conclusively that the countries that
left the gold standard early suffered a less severe Depression than those that stayed on.
2 The
international transmission of the Great Depression occurred for two key reasons. First, fixed
exchange rates under the gold standard transmitted adverse shocks from one country to another. 
Second, commitment to the gold standard deterred countries from pursuing expansionary
monetary policies to counteract these shocks.
3  The foregoing view of the gold standard is
supportive of the Friedman-Schwartz hypothesis in so far as it helps explain how banking panics
in the US could have produced a world-wide depression.  However, this view also suggests that
                                               
1 For a recent review of the causes of the US Depression, see Romer (1993).
2 See, for example, Choudhri and Kochin (1980), Eichengreen and Sachs (1985), Bernanke and James (1991) and
Bernanke (1995).
3 Eichengreen (1992) documents the case of the central European countries (Austria, Germany, and Hungary), each of
which in the summer of 1931 suffered banking crises.  When the monetary authorities attempted to use expansionary
policy to allay the banking crises, their currencies were subjected to speculative attacks, forcing them to abandon
unrestricted convertibility to gold. Belgium in 1935 was forced off the gold standard under similar circumstances.4
gold standard constraints might have prevented the Federal Reserve from increasing high-
powered money sufficiently to offset decreases in the money stock induced by banking crises.  A
policy of expanding domestic credit to stabilize the stock of money might have aroused doubts
about US commitment to the gold standard and led to a loss of gold reserves. Eichengreen (1992)
argues that the loss would have been sufficiently large to force the US off the gold standard.
His argument points to the imperatives of the international gold standard rather than
ineptness of the Federal Reserve as primarily responsible for not averting the Great Depression.
For Friedman and Schwartz (1963), however, the Federal Reserve held so large a stock of gold
that even had such a loss occurred, it did not pose a serious threat to the US commitment to the
gold standard.
Although there is considerable interest in this issue, little empirical work exists on
estimating the loss of gold reserves that might have resulted, had the Federal Reserve undertaken
expansionary monetary policy to offset the banking panics during the Great Depression. The main
purpose of this paper is to undertake such an exercise.
Section 2 of the paper briefly reviews the history of the interwar gold standard, discusses
key developments before and during the Great Depression, and focuses on the international crises
from 1931 to 1933. Section 3 then goes on to develop a model that identifies key determinants of
gold flows from the US. The model can be used to simulate the behavior of gold reserves were
monetary policy expansionary during banking panics.  In view of the large size of the US
economy, the model explicitly takes into account the interaction between the US and the rest of
the world.  Even in the special case of perfect capital mobility (which represents the most severe
constraint for US policy), the model shows that the expansion of US domestic credit would have
been only partially offset by gold flows and it would have been technically possible for the Federal
Reserve to counter a decline in the stock of money.5
Section 4 empirically implements the paper's model using monthly data for four major
countries, France, Germany, the UK and the US. We consider two hypothetical scenarios of
expansionary monetary policy, one initiated after the first banking panic in October 1930, the
second after the crisis associated with sterling’s devaluation in September 1931. We account for
possible speculative attacks suggested by the recent literature on first and second generation
speculative attack models. We simulate  the time path of US gold reserves (as well as that of the
gold-reserve ratio) under the two hypothetical scenarios up to February 1933. 
In the first simulation, we show that a $1 billion open market purchase over the period
October 1930-February 1931 could have prevented the banking panics that followed by providing
the banking system with additional reserves, and would not have led to a gold drain in 1931-33
sufficient to deplete US gold reserves.
In the second simulation, we assume that the Federal Reserve would have increased
domestic credit by $1 billion after the British devaluation from September 1931 through January
1932. This policy would have been undertaken although the first hypothetical open market
purchase would not have been. Subsequent to the open market purchase, we show that US gold
reserves would have declined significantly but not sufficiently to reduce the gold ratio below the
statutory minimum requirement. The reason for the hypothetical large gold outflows in this
simulation, unlike the previous one, is that the British devaluation possibly could have shaken the
market’s confidence in the US commitment to gold parity. France would have conducted its
policy of dollar conversion, as it would not have under simulation 1. Except for France, the rest of
the world held limited dollar claims. 6
2. Historical Background: Financial Crises of the Gold Exchange Standard
2.1 Overview
The gold standard dissolved during World War I as all major countries, with the exception
of the United States, suspended gold convertibility de facto if not de jure. The gold exchange
standard was restored worldwide in the period 1924-27, when central bank statutes typically
required a cover ratio for currencies between 30 and 40 percent, divided between gold and
foreign exchange. Central reserve countries (the US and UK) were to hold reserves only in the
form of gold. By the end of 1928, 35 countries had their currencies officially convertible into
gold.
The restoration of convertibility to sterling in 1925 at an overvalued parity and to the franc
in 1928 at an undervalued parity led to maldistribution of gold, which was greatly aggravated by
the inappropriate policies that France and the United States pursued. Each of them as well as
other countries (Nurkse 1994)
4 consistently sterilized gold inflows, which reduced gold reserves
available to the rest of the world and enhanced deflationary pressure.
At the same time that France was absorbing gold from the rest of the world, so was the
United States, the world’s largest gold holder (see Figure 1). The Federal Reserve systematically
sterilized gold inflows during the 1920s and 1930s (Friedman and Schwartz 1963). In June 1928,
the US share of the world total monetary gold stock was 38.3 percent, the French share, 11.7
percent. In June 1931, the shares were, respectively, 40.8 and 19.6 percent (see Figure 2).
The gold exchange standard collapsed in the face of the shocks of the Great Depression.
                                               
4 For example, the German Reichsbank, which adopted policies to accumulate gold and rebuild its reserve position
following the German hyperinflation.7
Tight monetary policy by the Federal Reserve in 1928 to deflate the stock market boom and
France’s pro-gold policies precipitated a downturn in the US and the rest of the world in 1929. A
series of banking panics in the US subsequently transmitted deflationary and contractionary
pressures to the rest of the world on the gold standard.
As soon as doubts began to surface about the stability of the reserve currencies, central
banks scrambled to liquidate their foreign exchange reserves and replace them with gold. The
share of foreign exchange in global central bank reserves plummeted from 37 percent at the end of
1930 to 13 percent at the end of 1931 and 11 percent at the end of 1932 (Nurkse 1944, App. II).
The implosion of the foreign-exchange component of the global reserve base exerted strong
deflationary pressure on the world economy. Although total world gold reserves increased by $1
billion between 1930 and 1932 -- deflation stimulated gold output -- it was not enough to satisfy
the heightened central bank demand. To attract gold, they jacked up interest rates in the face of an
unprecedented slump.
2.2  Chronology of the Breakdown of the Gold Exchange Standard
Against the background of the international gold exchange standard, we consider in more
detail the events of 1931-33, when US adherence to gold may have been threatened. We focus on
three episodes: Fall 1931, Spring 1932, and Spring 1933, when the US may have faced
speculative attacks on the dollar. We then discuss the available evidence on speculation at these
three dates.
2.2.1 The UK Suspends Gold Convertibility, Autumn 1931
Early strains on the gold exchange standard appeared in 1927. An incipient run on sterling
in July 1927, following massive capital flows to France, was averted by the cooperative action by
the central banks of the four core countries. As its contribution to the cooperative arrangement,
the Federal Reserve reduced the discount rate and the buying rate on bankers’ acceptances.8
Although the 1929 downturn produced strain on sterling, the defining crisis of the gold
exchange system occurred in 1931. The failure of the Austrian Creditanstalt in May 1931 led to a
German crisis with internal drains from the banking system. Only later were foreign deposits
withdrawn. The Bank of England extended short-term credits to the crisis-stricken central
European countries, whose reserves had been declining in the face of persistent balance of
payments deficits. A speculative attack in September 1931 on the Bank was successful (Capie,
Mills, and Wood 1986). Johnson (1997) notes that Britain gave up, not because of an immediate
crisis -- it floated after raising the discount rate to only 4 ½ percent -- but because of the long-
term problem in its balance of payments, with no foreseeable improvement.
5 
French pressure then forced the Federal Reserve to raise the US discount rate in two steps
within a week by an unprecedented 2 percentage points from 1 ½ to 3 ½ percent as a quid pro
quo for delaying conversion into gold of more than $500 million the French held in dollar assets.
This action halted the external drain but only served to exacerbate a domestic banking panic.
2.2.2  Federal Reserve Open Market Operations, Spring 1932
From March through June 1932, under Congressional pressure, the Federal Reserve
pursued an expansionary open market policy, purchasing $1 billion in government securities.
According to Friedman and Schwartz, the policy was successful in halting the downturn. It was
ended, however, although much too soon, once Congress went into recess. Federal Reserve
officials, who adhered to a deflationary real bills doctrine, did not believe that further purchases
would help the banks or improve the economy.  Eichengreen, however, contends that the Federal
Reserve stopped the purchase program because of concern over its gold reserves, especially the
                                               
5 According to Eichengreen and Jeanne (1998), the British devalued sterling because of rising unemployment, which
made it impossible to pursue the contractionary policies required to defend the parity.9
level of free gold. Although gold reserves declined through June 1932, at $3.5 billion they were
still above the statutory limit.  July 1932 marked the end of central bank withdrawals from New
York.
2.2.3 The US Bank Holiday, March 1933
The final crisis of the dollar occurred in 1933. Massive banking panics across the US led
to a series of state bank holidays.
Fears that the newly elected President Roosevelt would devalue the dollar upon taking
office led mainly domestic residents to convert dollars into gold. Speculators in New York for the
first time bought sterling.
 The decline in the gold reserves of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York below its
statutory limit triggered the request for New York State to grant a Bank Holiday on Friday,
March 3, and Roosevelt’s decision to declare a one-week national Bank Holiday on Monday,
March 6. The Bank Holiday succeeded in allaying the banking panic and in halting the gold drain.
Although the link with gold was cut in the following month, a modest gold drain did not resume
until some months before the Gold Reserve Act was passed on January 31, 1934.
2.2.4 Evidence on Speculative Activity Against the Dollar
To examine in greater detail the view that expansionary monetary policy would have
aroused speculative activity against the dollar, we look at the available sources of information on
the subject.
6
                                               
6 There are two main sources of statistical information about the willingness of foreigners to hold dollar exchange. One
source is a table showing outstanding amounts of short-term foreign liabilities reported by banks in New York City,
including the Federal Reserve Bank of New York,  at end-of-month dates beginning May 1929 through June 1931,
thereafter weekly (Banking and Monetary Statistics 1943, Table 161). Detail is available through mid-February 1932
for 6, subsequently 9 European countries, the rest, and total Europe, and 4 other areas. The second source is a monthly
table from 1914 on, showing the U.S. monetary gold stock, net gold imports, and gold under earmark (ibid., Table 156).
In addition, weekly Saturday quotations of spot and forward rates for one month and three months of the dollar  and six
other European currencies are available (Einzig 1937). The forward rates show the premium or discount in relation to
sterling.10
The question about possible speculative activity centers on the Fall of 1931 and the Spring
of 1932. That speculation arose in the weeks before the Roosevelt administration took office in
March 1933 is unquestionable. The trigger, however, was not expansionary monetary policy, but
rumors that the gold content of the dollar would be devalued, which turned out to be true.
At the earlier dates, suppose the data show a loss of gold by the US. Is this evidence that
the dollar was under attack? Suppose the data show an acceleration of a loss of gold. Is this
evidence of a heightened attack on the dollar? The problem of interpretation arises because the
official holders of dollar claims in the continental creditor countries had a motive other than
doubts about the US to want to increase their gold reserves. The motive to convert all dollar
exchange into gold may well have been paramount -- whatever the condition of the US. 
Moreover, gold withdrawals from the US were arranged with the consent of the US. It was not
necessarily the case that an increase in withdrawals spelled increased lack of confidence in the US.
   What do we learn from the sources at the two dates when the United States may have
faced attacks on the dollar?
 In the first of the three episodes, in the six weeks following British suspension of the gold
standard in September 1931, short-term liabilities of U.S. banks to Europeans declined by  $400
million, the U.S. monetary gold stock declined by $450 million, and the combined monetary gold
stock of France, Belgium, Netherlands, and Switzerland rose by an equivalent amount.
 As Brown (1940, 1222) states, the gold drain has been described “incorrectly, as attacks
upon the dollar.” While the U.S. lost gold to the European gold standard countries, in September
                                                                                                                                                      
  The sources do not distinguish private from official holders of  dollar exchange nor when the US lost gold how much
was transferred to private or official claimants. Under the gold exchange standard, official holders of dollar exchange
were clearly significant participants in the foreign exchange market and data on their gold holdings can be correlated
with opposite movements in U.S. gold.11
and October 1931, it still drew gold from Argentina, Canada, and Japan. The main drain was to
France. France had an “uncompromising hostility to the gold exchange standard” (Brown 1940, p.
1179), but it did not seek “wholesale conversion” of its dollar balances either before or after
September 21, the date of British suspension. This was not a speculative attack, in the sense of
the current use of those terms. According to Einzig (1937, p. 269) the forward dollar rate
depreciated for two weeks from October 17 to 31, and then went to a premium for the rest of the
year. This was a transitory dollar scare, at best,  not a settled loss of confidence in the dollar.
 Two emissaries of the Bank of France arrived in America in October to discuss with the
Federal Reserve and the Treasury the terms under which its dollar balances would be withdrawn.
At the end of the month a communiqué by Hoover and Laval on a visit to Washington emphasized
the maintenance of the gold standard in France and the United States as essential for the
restoration of economic stability and confidence. Randolph Burgess at the October meeting of the
board of the BIS gave official assurance that the American gold standard was not in danger. In
November and December 1931 the foreign drain temporarily ceased.
The second episode when the U.S. may have faced a speculative attack was during the
Federal Reserve open market purchase from March to June 1932. During this period short-term
liabilities of U.S. banks to Europeans declined by $550 million, the U.S. monetary gold stock
declined by $535 million, and the combined increase in the European gold standard countries’
gold was $280 million. The liquidation of dollar balances by France, Holland, Belgium, and
Switzerland, which was completed by July 1932, was arranged to minimize disturbances to the
American market. Was this a speculative attack, when the so-called attackers sought to achieve
their objective with the least possible damage to the victim? During the period of gold loss to the
continental creditor countries, and during the second half of 1932, Canada, South America, and
the Far East continued to ship gold to the US -- a measure of confidence in the US commitment12
to the gold standard.
By the end of 1932, the US gold stock was at a level higher than in October 1931.
According to Henry Parker Willis (1934, p. 17), there was no threat to the gold standard even at
the height of the continental withdrawals: “fears of a European drain, general among reserve
bankers” in 1932, “had proven mythical.”
Einzig (1937, p. 270) describes the forward dollar in the first half of 1932 as “abnormally
undervalued, compared to its interest parities.” This was the period when the Federal Reserve was
actually conducting open market purchases that clearly did not drive the U.S. off gold even if the
evidence in the forward rate is regarded as a possible speculative attack on the dollar. The attack
failed and post-June 1932, the forward rate was brought practically to parity with spot dollars.
 Although there is little evidence that speculation against the dollar in the modern sense of
the recent speculative attack literature was forthcoming from official sources, it is still possible
that private agents in other countries or in the US, acting alone or through investment banks and
other intermediaries could have taken a speculative position against the dollar in 1931 and 1932. 
The available data does not permit us to isolate these actions.  Furthermore we were unable to
find any mention of such activities in the narratives of knowledgeable contemporaries to which we
had access.
The third episode of gold loss in February 1933, as indicated above, was unlike the earlier
ones. Withdrawals by foreign countries had greatly reduced their US balances. They were no
longer a threat to dollar, if they ever were.  Foreigners had essentially completed their
withdrawals by the beginning of August 1932, and had built up dollar holdings during the next
half year.
The British Exchange Equalisation Account (which held dollars valued at 46 million
pounds, at the current exchange rate of $3.36 per pound) in January 1933 began to replace dollars13
with gold. It did so partly at the request of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, which was
afraid of sudden gold withdrawals, and partly because of the possibility of an American
devaluation (Howson 1980, p. 35). The British withdrew only 8 million pounds equivalent in
dollars during the next two months. During the four weeks from the beginning of February until
the Bank Holiday, withdrawals amounted only to $150 million. Remaining balances were held to
service ordinary transactions.
This time it was the US banking crisis that began during the 1932 Presidential campaign
that was one cause for concern. Another was that after Roosevelt’s victory there was ground for
the belief that the U.S. would leave the gold standard. Private investors and private bankers sold
dollars short and used the proceeds to buy sterling. In addition, depositors who withdrew funds
previously held as currency now demanded gold for dollars. Willis believed that it should have
been possible “to offset and cancel the effects of such transactions and demands” (p. 19), given
central bank tools, the size of the US monetary gold stock, a favorable trade balance, and sizable
foreign investments. Instead, he describes Federal Reserve managers as thrown “into a condition
bordering on panic” (1934, p. 14). They were ready to surrender the gold standard, when there
was no fundamental reason to do so.
2.3 Could Expansionary Monetary Policy Have Averted the Crises of the Gold Exchange
Standard?
Eichengreen (1992) argues that under the gold standard banking crises and currency crises
were intertwined. In the Depression experiences of a number of European countries, incipient
banking crises were aggravated by capital flight, as both domestic and foreign deposits were
shifted abroad in anticipation of capital controls and devaluation. Central banks refrained from
acting as lenders of last resort to provide liquidity to their banking systems because of fear that
expansionary domestic credit would precipitate an attack on their gold reserves. The only solution14
to the dilemma was to cut the link with gold and devalue.
7
This analysis, which seems sound for the experience of the small open economies of
Europe, may not apply to the US case, a large, relatively closed economy, with very substantial
gold reserves. The issue is, how much gold would have been lost had the US followed the
requisite expansionary open market purchases to counter the banking panics, and would the gold
losses have been sufficient to breach the required gold cover statute of 40 percent against Federal
Reserve notes and 35 percent against Federal Reserve deposits.
An auxiliary issue relates to free gold, the excess of gold reserves over that required to
meet the statutory 40 percent reserve requirement against notes and to cover the shortfall of
eligible securities backing the remaining 60 percent of Federal Reserve notes. According to
Eichengreen (1992), by the end of 1931 Federal Reserve free gold had fallen below what he
regards as the critical level of $500 million. This level of free gold, he maintains, would not have
allowed the Federal Reserve to conduct an open market purchase sufficient to make up the $2
billion decline in M1 that had occurred after the UK left gold. At a later point, we note that
Eichengreen’s conjecture is erroneous, since he neglects the role of the money multiplier that,
together with the change in high-powered money, determines the change in M1.
For two reasons we also are skeptical that the level of free gold was an actual constraint
                                               
7 In his conclusion Eichengreen (1992, 392-93) states: “. . . the failure of monetary . . . authorities to take offsetting
action once the Depression was underway is no longer perplexing once one acknowledges the role of gold standard
constraints.  Unilateral action to  . . . make available additional money and credit was certain to create balance of
payments deficits where they did not already exist and to magnify these deficits with which central banks were already
attempting to cope. . . . gold convertibility would be threatened. Even the provision of liquidity to a banking system in
distress might cast doubt over the official commitment to gold, prompting the transfer of bank deposits out of the country
and aggravating the problem of domestic financial instability.  The Federal Reserve and the Bank of France, possessing
extensive gold reserves, were less immediately threatened than other central banks. But even they had very limited room
for maneuver (our emphasis).”  And earlier he comments (p. 295): “In principle, the Fed could have used expansionary
open market operations to prevent the decline in the money supply. It refused to do so for fear of endangering the gold
parity,” although he does not cite any supporting statement by a Fed official.15
on Federal Reserve monetary policy. It never reported dollar amounts of free gold. Only in its
1932 annual report (p. 17), issued four months after the Glass-Steagall Act was passed, did it
present a chart for 1929-32, based on last-Wednesday of the month total gold reserves, with
different shading for required reserves, additional gold needed as collateral, and free gold.
Eichengreen, in his eyeball reading from the chart, states that free gold in October 1931 was
reduced to $400 million. If it were in fact at that low level that month, it is all the more
incomprehensible that the Federal Reserve did not move heaven and earth to force a change in
eligibility requirements. The impression that free gold was not in fact the deterrent to
expansionary monetary policy that the Federal Reserve and its supporters allege it to have been is
further bolstered by Hoover’s complaint (1952, 115-18) that, although he had proposed on
October 6, 1931, that eligibility requirements be broadened, no action had been taken until four
months later. At a meeting at the White House with Governor Harrison of the New York Fed and
Governor Meyer of the Board on February 8, 1932, the situation was said to be critical, and
Hoover’s proposal was finally agreed to. In addition, there is no evidence that the Federal Reserve
during the months between the British abandonment of gold and the adoption of the Glass-
Steagall Act was lobbying for this crucial legislative change. The failure of Congress to act on
Hoover’s proposal suggests the absence of any urgency. We therefore question whether free gold
was truly a constraint on Federal Reserve performance.
 The Federal Reserve acknowledged in the report that although free gold amounted to
only $416 million on February 24, 1932, when the act was adopted, it could have been increased
to $542 million simply by reducing the volume of Federal Reserve notes held by Federal Reserve
banks in their own vaults. At no point did the Federal Reserve take such a step to increase free
gold. Moreover, although the Federal Reserve held $740 million in U.S. government securities,
they were not pledged as collateral backing for Federal Reserve notes until May 5, 1932 (p. 19),16
months after it had the authority to do so. The story that free gold was the reason it could not
conduct open market purchases should be swallowed with a big dose of salt. The statements by
Secretary Ogden Mills and Randolph Burgess in the weeks before enactment of Glass-Steagall
that Eichengreen cites about how close the U.S. was to being forced off the gold standard should
be understood as political strong-arming to get the bill passed. Incidentally, as we noted at an
earlier point, Randolph Burgess assured the BIS that the gold standard was not in danger in
October 1931, despite Eichengreen’s low-ball figure for free gold that month.
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A second issue of importance is that the effect of Federal Reserve expansionary policies
would have been sufficient to prevent banking panics in the US from having effects on the rest of
the world. Such policies would have prevented crises elsewhere. Had the US money supply not
collapsed, deflationary pressure on the rest of the world might have been avoided.
3.  Basic Model
This section develops a basic two-country model to determine US gold flows and to
provide a framework for simulating the behavior of US gold reserves under alternative monetary
policies. We assume that the US demand for money in period t  is given by
0,   <     0,   >      ,   v   +   i   +   y     +     =   p   -   m ) 1 ( 2 1 t t 2 t 1 0 t t a a a a a
where mt , pt  and yt  represent logs of the money stock, the price level and real income, it
denotes the interest rate and vt  is the error term.  The determinants of mt  can be expressed by
the following two identities:
,   ) H ( log   +       m ) 2 ( t t t m ”
                                               
8 Meltzer also argues that, if free gold was in fact a binding constraint, the Federal Reserve could have followed earlier
precedent and temporarily suspended gold reserve requirements.17
, D G H ) 3 ( t t t + =
where mt  is the log of the money multiplier while Ht, Gt and Dt  represent high-powered money,
gold reserves and domestic credit (defined as high-powered money excluding gold reserves).
Using (1) - (3) after expressing these relations in first differences, and utilizing the
approximation that  H  / H   =   ) H ( log t t t D D  with  2  /  ) H   +   H (     H 1 - t t t ” , we derive the following
relation for determining US gold flows:
(4)  .   v   +   i   +   y   +   p   +     -   H  / D   -   =   H  / G t t 2 t 1 t t t t t t D D a D a D m D D D
Equation (4) can be utilized to examine the effect of an expansion in domestic credit on gold
flows.  Although the direct effect of  Dt D  on  Gt D  equals  1   -  in (4),  Dt D  could also exert an
indirect effect through other variables on the right hand side of (4).  Over a very short period (say,
a month), it is plausible to assume that  m D t,  pt D ,  yt D  and  vt D  are exogenous to  Dt D  and  it D
is the only potential channel for the indirect effect.  We explicitly model the monetary relations in
the rest of the world to explore this channel.
Assuming that the money demand function in the rest of the world is of the same form as
(1), representing the determinants of money stocks by identities similar to (2) and (3), and using
an asterisk to denote rest-of-the-world variables and parameters, we obtain
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9 Assume that the world stock of gold is fixed and the US price of gold is constant over
time.  These assumptions imply that gold flows in the US and the rest of the world are linked as
follows:
                                               
9 In this relation non-gold international reserves are included in D
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where et denotes the exchange rate in representing the price of foreign currency in US dollars.
We express the relationship between interest rates in the US and abroad as
(7) ,     +   x   +   i   =   i t t
*
t t e
wherext  denotes the expected rate of US dollar depreciation and et  represents departures from
perfect capital mobility (or uncovered interest parity) caused by factors such as risk premia,
transaction costs, information lags and capital controls.  If the gold standard had operated
smoothly, no changes in gold parities would have been expected and xt  would have equalled
zero.  In this case, the Federal Reserve would still have been able to affect the interest rate
differential,  i   -   i
*
t t , if departures from perfect capital mobility allowed it to systematically influence
et .  However, even if the interest rate differential could not have been changed by the Federal
Reserve, the large size of the US would have permitted it to affect the world interest rate and
hence follow an independent monetary policy under the gold standard.
Using (4), (5), (6) and the first-difference form of (7), we derive the following relation that
explicitly shows the key US and rest-of-the-world variables which determine US gold flows:
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1   - t  t t D ” g .  Note that the term,gt , represents
an adjustment for changes in the foreign price of gold and in periods when this price is constant, it
equals zero.  Although, for simplicity, we have discussed the derivation of (8) in terms of one
foreign country, this equation, in fact, generalizes to any number of foreign countries under the
assumption that all foreign countries have the same money demand functions.  In this multi-19
country case, rest-of-the-world variables represent weighted averages of country variables with
each country's weight equal to its share of the rest-of-the-world stock of high-powered money.
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We can use (8) to examine the offset coefficient - - that is, the proportion of an increase in
US domestic credit offset by gold outflows in the short run.  Consider the special case in which:
(1) no changes in gold parities are expected and thus xt  equals zero, and (2) there is either
perfect capital mobility so that et equals zero or near-perfect capital mobility in the sense that  e D t
is independent of  Dt D .  In this case, (8) implies that the offset coefficient equals  qt   - .  As the US
stock of high-powered money represented a substantial portion of the world stock during the
Great Depression, qt was significantly less than one. Thus even with perfect or near-perfect
capital mobility, gold flows would not have severely constrained the Federal Reserve's ability to
determine the high-powered stock of money in the short run.  The Federal Reserve would, of
course, have been less constrained under imperfect mobility in which case the absolute value of
the offset coefficient would be smaller than qt   .
11
                                               
10 Basic relations for country  j  in the rest of the world are
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currency in US dollars (assumed, for simplicity, to be constant over time).  Then using revised (6) along with (4), (5)
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11 Under imperfect capital mobility, an increase in domestic credit would lower the interest-rate differential via a
decrease in et .  If we assume, for simplicity, that  e D p e 1   - t  t t t   +   H / D   =   , with  0,   <   p then the offset coefficient
would equal  )   -   (1   - 2 t a p q according to (8).20
To simplify the model, suppose that the income and semi-interest elasticities of the money
demand function are the same in both the US and the rest of the world, and the income elasticity
equals unity.  For this case (assumed in the basic simulation discussed in the next section), setting
1   =     =  
*
1 1 a a  and  a a
*
2 2   =   , we can simplify (8) as
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We use the above model to construct expansionary money counterfactuals, which would
have allowed the Federal Reserve to pursue a monetary policy to prevent large decreases in the
stock of money. Our counterfactuals distinguish policy needed during normal periods from policy
needed during banking panics. During normal periods, small changes in domestic credit would
suffice to produce money growth that is consistent with the gold standard.  During banking
panics, on the other hand, a key consideration would be to restore confidence in the banking
system.  An appropriate policy in these circumstances would be to expand domestic credit
sufficiently to relieve shortages of bank reserves and avoid panic-induced bank failures. 
Expansionary monetary policy can thus be expressed as
(10)        ,  
  panics   banking   during    
periods   normal   during  




















12 Note that expansionary actions are required only during banking panics.  With
                                               
12 To increase bank reserves, d
b
t  would have to be large enough to exceed   G   -   C t t D D , where C  is the currency held
by public.  The amount needed to satisfy this condition would be especially large if a currency drain during a banking
panic is accompanied by gold outflows caused by speculation.21
appropriate policy during normal periods (i. e., suitable choice of d
n
t ), (10) would be compatible
with fixed gold parities in the long run. 
Given policy (10), US gold flows would be determined by (9) and the following two
relations implied by  (3), its rest-of the-world counterpart and (6) with  e et = :
(11)  ,   G   +   D   +   H   =   H t t 1   - t  t D D
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To construct our counterfactuals, we do not explicitly model the determinants of gold flows,
D
*
t D ,  m D t,  m D
*
t ,  t p¢ D ,  t y¢ D  and ut . However, we first make certain plausible assumptions
(discussed below) about how expansionary monetary policy would affect their time paths. Given
the assumed time paths, we solve the model represented by (9) and (10)-(12) for the time paths of
Gt D ,  Dt D , Ht and H
*
t .  This solution is used to simulate the behavior of US gold reserves, Gt,
and the ratio of gold reserves to high-powered money,  H  / G t t .
4.  Simulations of US Gold Reserves and the Gold-Reserve Ratio
We now empirically implement our model using monthly data from 1926:7 to 1933:2,
which period begins with all major countries adhering to the gold standard and ends with the US
leaving the gold standard.  To estimate the rest-of-the-world variables in our model, we use data
for three large countries, the UK, France and Germany.
13  These countries accounted for a
significant proportion of high-powered money and the monetary gold stock held outside the US.
14
 However, the omission of other countries with significant gold reserves could bias our estimates
                                               
13 For the data used, see the Data Appendix.
14 The share of the UK, France and Germany in central bank gold reserves minus the US share in 1929-31 is 57 percent.
The world consists of the 21 countries included in Bordo and Eichengreen (1998b), which account for about 75 percent
of the 1928 total in Federal Reserve (1943).  The same share for high-powered money for the three countries as a share22
and we explore the magnitude of this bias later.  The price levels and outputs were measured by
indexes of consumer (retail) prices and industrial production.  As monthly series for these indexes
were very noisy, they were smoothed using the Hodrick-Prescott filter.
Before discussing our expansionary-money counterfactuals, we briefly examine how our
model fits monthly data on US gold flows.  We can express relation (9) in the following testable
form:
,   u   +   z   +     =   H s  / G ) 13 ( t t 1 0 t t t b b D






t t t t   +   y   +   p   +     +     -   H /   D   +   H /   D -   =   z ¢ D ¢ D D D D D , and the model implies that
  0   =   0 b  and  1   =   1 b .  We estimated (13) by OLS, using our data from 1926:7 to 1933:2.  The
results of this estimation show that  zt  exerts a significant positive effect on  H s  / G t t t D .
15  The
coefficient b1, however, is significantly less than 1.  Our monthly data - - especially, the indexes
for the rest-of-the-world variables - - are likely to involve substantial measurement errors and
these errors could have biased the estimate of b1downwards.
It is also interesting to examine the behavior of ut  over time.  According to (9), ut
represents a composite shock that includes not only shocks to money demand ( vt D  and  v
*
t D ) but
also the influence of speculation and departures from uncovered interest parity (via  xt D  and
e D t ).  Figure 3 shows the values of ut  from 1926:7 to 1933:2, estimated from (13) with the
                                                                                                                                                      
of the world less the US is 55 percent (League of Nations, various issues).
15Estimates of the regression are as follows:
  (4.125)   (0.966)      
,   u   +   z   0.546   +   0.002   =   H s / G t t t t t D
R2 = 0.179, standard error of regression = 0.020, DW Statistics = 1.516, (t-values in parentheses)23
constraint (implied by the model) that  0   =   0 b  and  1   =   1 b .  During the early 1930s (the period
relevant to our counterfactuals discussed below), Figure 3 shows large negative values of ut for
the months of October 1931, June 1932, and February 1933. One possible explanation of the
three large negative residuals is that they were caused by speculative attacks (resulting from shifts
in  t x ).  If speculative attacks did occur, it is interesting to examine what the source of these
attacks was and how dollar speculation would have been influenced by our counterfactuals.  We
explore these questions below.  However, since the historical evidence (discussed in section 2)
that speculative attacks occurred is not compelling, we also consider the possibility that the three
residuals were produced by large exogenous shocks that would not have been affected by our
counterfactuals.
To explore the role of dollar speculation, we first consider a first-generation speculative
attack model, which assumes that the US would have left the gold standard if the Gt/Ht ratio fell
to some critical level, f  (e.g., determined by legal reserve requirements). Following the approach
of Flood and Garber (1984) and Blanco and Garber (1986), we develop such a model for our
large-country case in Appendix 1. A critical variable in this model is the shadow exchange rate --
that is, the hypothetical exchange rate that would prevail (under permanently flexible exchange
rates) if US gold reserves fell to the critical level,  t H f . This rate evolves as a function of US
excess reserves ( t t H G f - ) and relative levels of US money multiplier, output and prices (i.e.,
* - t t m m , 
* - t t y y , and 
* - t t p p ). The probability of US devaluation equals the probability that the
shadow exchange rate exceeds the actual exchange rate.
 According to our estimates (discussed in Appendix 1), the predicted value of the shadow
exchange rate for October 1931 was much below the actual exchange rate and implied almost
zero probability of US devaluation in that month. The shadow exchange rate rose in response to24
large gold outflows in October 1931 and then June 1932, but its predicted value stayed
sufficiently below the actual exchange rate to imply a negligible likelihood of US devaluation even
in February 1933. Thus, if there were speculative attacks in the three critical months,  this model
is  not able to explain the attacks.
An approach based on second-generation models seems more promising in explaining why
speculative attacks may have occurred. As discussed by Flood and Marion (1997), the
commitment to a  fixed exchange rate in the “second-generation models” is not state invariant but
can depend on a number of state variables. To incorporate this feature in our model in a simple
way, we consider f  a variable (instead of a constant), which is potentially a function of factors
that could have influenced the U.S. commitment to the gold standard. An upward shift in f 
would raise the shadow exchange rate  (by decreasing  t t H G f - ) and hence could lead to an
increase in  xt. Using this approach, speculation in the three critical months could be attributed to
a combination of worsening economic conditions and certain events. A speculative attack in
October 1931, for example, might have been triggered by the UK devaluation in September 1931,
which weakened the international commitment to the gold standard, and could have suggested a
weakening of the US resolve to adhere to the gold standard during a depression. Actions by the
US Congress and the Federal Reserve from March through June 1932 might have signaled a shift
in policy and lead to another attack in June 1932. Finally, speculation against the US dollar in
February 1933 could have resulted from the internal drain in that month and the expectation that
the Roosevelt administration would abandon the gold standard in an effort to check the deepening
depression.  
The Federal Reserve could have undertaken expansionary monetary policy, as represented25
by (10), at different stages of the Great Depression.
16  A critical time for the pursuit of such a
policy was the onset of the first banking crisis in October 1930.  Therefore, we first consider a
counterfactual in which expansionary policy is initiated in this month.  It is often thought that the
gold standard became a much more important constraint on US monetary policy after the UK
devaluation.
17  We thus also consider a second counterfactual in which expansionary policy is
implemented in September 1931.  For each counterfactual, we start with a number of plausible
assumptions about the behavior of key variables, and later explore the sensitivity of our results to
variations in these assumptions.
4.1 Counterfactual 1: Expansionary Policy, October 1930-February 1931
Our basic assumption is that if the Federal Reserve had increased domestic credit
sufficiently in response to the first wave of banking panics, subsequent banking panics would have
been averted.  Although it is difficult to determine the precise amount of change in domestic credit
that would have been adequate to restore confidence in the banking system, we suppose that a $1
billion increase in domestic credit from October 1930 to February 1931 (instead of an actual
decrease of $37 million over this period) would have been more than enough for this purpose.
18
Domestic credit expansion of this magnitude would have easily met the need for additional bank
reserves and more than offset the money-supply effect of the decrease in the money multiplier
                                               
16 Such knowledge was available and was used in the 1920s, by Benjamin Strong to conduct open market operations to
smooth economic activity, to maintain price stability, and to prevent banking panics. This knowledge could have been
utilized by his successors to mitigate the deflationary experience of the Great Depression and to prevent its transmission
to the rest of the world.
17 See, for example, Romer (1993).  Eichengreen (1992) also focuses on this period in discussing the gold-standard
constraint for US monetary policy.
18 Open market operations of similar amounts are suggested by Friedman and Schwartz (1963) for the first eight months
of 1930 or the first six months of 1931.  In our counterfactual, we set d
b
t  equal to $200 million from October 1930 to
February 1931 and d
n
t  equal to - $10 million from March 1931 to February 1933.  These values yield a rate of money
growth (M2) of about 2.4 % over the simulation period, which is approximately equal to the growth rate in the pre-
simulation period.26
during the crisis. Furthermore, if the open market purchase had been directed to the provision of
bank reserves, there would have been no direct offset on free gold.
19 We expect that under this
policy, the money multiplier would have started recovering by March 1931 and then move
gradually towards its normal level.  We use the following model to simulate the time path of the
multiplier (in logs) from 1931:3 to 1933:2:
(14)   ,   +   )   -   a(   =   1   -   t 1   -   t t m m m m
where m  is the average value of mt  for the pre-crises period 1926:7-1930:9.  The speed of
adjustment towards this normal level m  depends on the parameter a, and we initially set it equal
to a conservative value of 0.1.  (See Figure 4 for the path of mt  generated by this model).
We also assume that by restoring financial stability and arresting the decline in the money
stock, the expansionary policy would have significantly reduced the severity of the Depression in
the US as well as the rest of the world.  This assumption has a number of implications.  First, the
UK would not have devalued in September 1931 and there would have been no reason for
speculation that the US dollar might be devalued (hence xt  would equal zero).  We assume that
the three large negative ut  shocks for October 1931, June 1932 and February 1933, which could
be attributed to speculation, would not have occurred in this case.
In our simulation, we thus set ut  (as estimated in Figure 3) equal to zero for these three
months but otherwise assume no change in the behavior of ut .  Second, if the UK had not
devalued and devaluation by the US not have been feared, it is likely that France would not have
accelerated conversion of dollar claims into gold reserves that it sterilized accompanied by a
                                               
19 However, there would have been a small indirect effect, to the extent that member banks reduced their borrowing, and
hence eligible paper would have declined.27
significant decrease in its domestic credit after September 1931.
20 We assume that the average
change in French domestic credit for the 1931:10-1933:2 period would have been the same as it
was in the 1926:7-1931:9 period, and we adjust the mean of the series on French domestic credit
(for the post-devaluation period) accordingly in calculating  D
* D .  Finally, since the US
experienced a worse contraction than other countries, especially the countries (such as the UK)
that left the gold standard in 1931, we would expect the expansionary policy to have brought
about a stronger improvement in US economic activity relative to the rest of the world. 
Consequently, we assume that from 1931:3 to 1933:2,  t p¢ D  and  t y¢ D  both equal their mean rate
of change for the pre-crises 1926:7-1930:9 period.
Given these assumptions, we use (9)-(12) to construct the smooth money counterfactual
1.  The main results of this counterfactual are presented in Figures 5 and 6.  Figure 5 shows that
gold reserves under counterfactual 1 fall after the first banking crisis and again after UK
devaluation, reaching their lowest level in July 1932.  However, even at their lowest level,
simulated gold reserves are only about $100 million less than the actual stock.  The behavior of
the gold-reserve ratio under counterfactual 1 is shown in Figure 6.  After falling sharply during the
domestic credit expansion up to February 1931, this ratio stabilizes until August 1932 and
increases moderately afterwards.   The ratio stays above 54 percent throughout the simulation
period, and thus there would clearly have been an adequate supply of free gold -- that is, gold not
required for the backing of eligible liabilities -- under counterfactual 1.
We performed a large number of simulations to explore the sensitivity of our results to
variations in assumption regarding: (1) the behavior of the multiplier, (2) French policy, and (3)
                                               
20 Of the three countries, the average value of domestic credit change decreased significantly after the UK devaluation
only in the case of France.28
relative US macroeconomic performance (i.e., the behavior of  t y¢ D and  t p¢ D ). We also considered
the possibility that the three large negative residuals represent exogenous shocks and would not
have been eliminated under expansionary policy.  The results of this analysis are summarized in
the Sensitivity Appendix 2. The analysis shows that even under the most unfavorable assumptions,
the gold-reserve ratio stays well above 50 percent in counterfactual 1.
4.2  Counterfactual 2: Expansionary Policy, September 1931- January 1932
 We assume that the Federal Reserve increases domestic credit by about an additional
billion dollars from September 1931 to January 1932.
21 Expansion of domestic credit by an extra
billion dollars would have allowed high-powered money to increase by more than the actual
increase in the public's holding of currency and would have considerably eased the pressure on
bank reserves. It is thus plausible to suppose that the money multiplier would have recovered after
some lag, perhaps at a lower pace as compared to the first counterfactual.  We assume that the
multiplier would have fallen, as it actually did, up to December 1931 but that it would have
started adjusting towards its normal level by January 1932.  We again use model (14) to simulate
the behavior of the multiplier but assume a more conservative value of .025 for the adjustment
parameter, a.  We would also expect some improvement in relative US economic performance
under this counterfactual.  We assume that this improvement takes place by the beginning of
1932, and starting January 1932, set both  t p¢ D  and  t y¢ D  equal to their average rates for the
1926:07-1931:09 period (which are lower than the corresponding rates assumed in the first
                                               
21 A similar counterfactual is discussed by Friedman and Schwartz (1963).  In our simulation, we assume the following
values of d
b
t  from September 1931 to January 1932 to ensure that high-powered money exceeds the actual increase in
currency held by public in each month:  250 in 1931:9, 1250 in 1931:10, 250 in 1931:11, 0 in 1931:12 and 150 in
1932:1.  The assumed increase in domestic credit over this period exceeds the actual increase by about $1050 million.
For the remaining simulation period, d
n
t is set equal to 0 to produce almost a zero rate of money growth of the pre-
simulation period.29
counterfactual).
It is less clear what effect counterfactual-2 expansionary policy would have had on
possible speculation against the dollar. As discussed above, a plausible explanation of dollar
speculation is that it resulted essentially from worsening economic conditions. To the extent that
this policy would have improved economic conditions, it would have been seen as strengthening
the US commitment to gold and thus would have caused less speculation. We assume
nevertheless that this policy would not have reduced possible dollar speculation in October 1931
or changed French policy reaction. Therefore, for counterfactual 2, we do not change the ut
shock for October 1931 or adjust the time path of French domestic credit. However, we assume
that improved economic performance resulting from the policy would have precluded further
speculation against the US dollar and set (as in counterfactual 1) the ut shocks for June 1932 and
February 1933 equal to zero. 
The behavior of gold reserves and the gold-reserve ratio under counterfactual 2 is also
shown in Figures 5 and 6.  In this counterfactual, both gold reserves and the gold-reserve ratio
would have declined sharply during the nine months after the UK devaluation, falling to their
lowest values in July 1932.  Even at this critical stage, however, gold reserves would have been
only about $750 million below their actual level and the gold-reserve ratio still above 42.5
percent.  Counterfactual 2 would, therefore, not have posed a serious problem for the US to stay
on the gold standard.
The results for our second counterfactual differ significantly from Eichengreen's (1992, pp.
295-6) estimate that a policy designed to offset the decline in the stock of (M1) money from
August 1931 to January 1932 would have decreased US gold reserves by $2 billion and forced the
US off the gold standard.  His calculations ignore the role of the money multiplier [see Bordo
(1994)], and do not use a model to determine gold flows.  Nevertheless, his estimate differs from30
ours largely because he considers a different policy.  Our counterfactual is based on a policy,
similar to the one suggested by Friedman and Schwartz (1963), which focuses on the need for an
adequate domestic-credit expansion to respond to the banking crises but does not require the
money stock to stay at the initial level.  Indeed, the (M2) money stock in our simulation falls from
September 1931 to July 1932 but then increases gradually up to February 1933 to reach a level
only about $300 million below its initial value. The Eichengreen experiment, on the other hand,
involves offsetting the August 1931 to January 1932 decline in the money stock over a short
period and hence requires a much bigger expansion in domestic credit.
22  In our view, if the
Federal Reserve had acted only after the UK devaluation, an expansionary program of the order
of magnitude assumed in our counterfactual [and suggested by Friedman and Schwartz (1963)]
would have been appropriate at this late stage.  Such a program would have improved economic
conditions without driving the US off the gold standard.
We also explored the sensitivity of the results of counterfactual 2 to a number of
variations. Our discussion below focuses on key variations (see Sensitivity Appendix 2 for other
variations and other details). An interesting issue is that counterfactual 2 may not have been
credible and, like the open market operations from March through June 1932, may in fact have
induced further speculation. To explore this possibility, we set the ut  shock for October 1931
equal to the sum of the actual residuals for both October 1931 and June 1932. This variation of
counterfactual 2 lowers the path of the gold-reserve ratio, but the ratio still stays above 41.5
percent. However, the large gold outflow in October 1931 (induced by the bigger ut  shock)
would now lower the path of Ht (as well as Mt). We thus consider another variation in which
domestic credit is increased by another $300 million in October 1931 to keep the path of Ht
                                               
22 Using our model, for example, we calculate that an increase in domestic credit of about 2300 million dollars (in
addition to the actual increase from September 1931 to January 1932) would have been needed to raise the stock of31
roughly the same as in our basic counterfactual. The gold-reserve ratio in this variant (which
combines a bigger shock with a greater injection of domestic credit) falls at its lowest level to
38.6 percent. If a slower recovery is also assumed, the lowest value of the ratio would be further
reduced to 38.3 percent. The statutory requirement, which was a weighted average of the 40
percent requirement for currency and the 35 percent requirement for deposits at the Federal
Reserve, depending on the relative shares of currency and deposits was about 37 percent in
October 1931 (the actual weighted average was 62.6 percent). The statutory requirement would
not have been breached. 
It should be emphasized that our simulation assumes the case of perfect or near-perfect
capital mobility (i.e., considers ut  exogenous to domestic-credit policy), which implies a high
offset coefficient (equal to the rest-of the-world share in world high-powered money).  There
were likely significant departures from this assumption, especially after the UK devaluation which
led to a wide range of restrictions on international capital flows. Austria, Germany, and Hungary
instituted capital controls in the summer of 1931. The UK and the sterling area introduced
controls at the end of 1931, as did Japan in 1932.  Thus, the estimate of gold loss resulting from
domestic credit expansion in our second counterfactual is likely to be overstated.
Our estimates omit a significant portion of the rest of the world.  To explore the bias
resulting from this omission, we modified our basic simulations to increase the size of H
*
t  such
that the aggregate high-powered money for UK, France and Germany is always 60 percent of H
*
t
(this percentage reflects the approximate share of the three countries in non-US world high-
powered money based on the 21-country sample in Bordo and Eichengreen (1998b)).  Holding
other factors constant, we find that this adjustment decreases the gold-reserve ratio only slightly
                                                                                                                                                      
(M2) money in January 1932 to the August 1931 level.32
and does not alter the implications of our results for the feasibility of expansionary money.
23
5.   Conclusions
The recent consensus view is that the gold standard is the key cause of the Great
Depression. This view has merit, first in the sense that deflationary shocks were transmitted by the
gold standard and, second, in the sense that for most countries continued adherence to gold
blocked their recoveries. These were small, open economies, with limited gold reserves. This was
not, however, the case for the US. The US was the largest country in the world, held massive
gold reserves, and hence was not constrained from using expansionary policy to offset banking
panics.  Indeed, under Benjamin Strong, the Federal Reserve had demonstrated its ability to
pursue such policies.
This conclusion holds even in the face of perfect international capital flows. Dollar claims
against the US were minor relative to the size of its gold reserves in contrast with the situation
today. Emerging countries that recently experienced crises hold outstanding international liabilities
far in excess of their international reserves. This made it hard for them to alleviate domestic
banking difficulties using domestic monetary policy.
The simulations we constructed, based on a model of a large open economy, indicate that
expansionary open market operations at two critical junctures of the Great Depression would
have been successful in averting the banking panics without endangering convertibility. Indeed,
had expansionary open market purchases been conducted in 1930, the Depression would not have
led to the international crises that followed.
                                               
23 The adjustment in H
*
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US UK France Germany Rest of World35
Figure 3
The Behavior of the Residual    ut , 1925:05-1933:0236
Figure 4
The Actual and Simulated Values of the Money Multiplier (in logs), 1926:07-1933:0237
Figure 5
The Actual and Simulated Values of US Gold Reserves (million dollars)38
Figure 6
The Actual and Simulated Values of US Gold-Reserve Ratio39
Data Appendix
Monthly US, UK, French, German, and rest of world gold reserves in Figures 1 and 2
come from Federal Reserve (1943).
Monthly data for UK, France, Germany and US used in section 4 are from the database
developed by Kwiecinska-Kalita [see her (1995) thesis for detailed description and sources of
these data].   Money supply series are based on an M3 definition of money for UK, M2 for US
and Germany, and M1 for France (time and saving deposits for France are not available for the
whole period).  The money supply and high-powered money data for the US are the same as in
Friedman and Schwartz (1963) and are already seasonally adjusted.  These data for other
countries were seasonally adjusted using a procedure based on moving averages.  Domestic credit
was defined as the difference between high-powered money and gold reserves.  Gold reserve
monthly data for France are available only since June 1928.  French gold reserves before this date
were estimated using the assumption that they were a fixed proportion of French high-powered
money.  Price level and output for each country were measured by indexes of consumer (retail)
prices and industrial production. These indexes were smoothed using the Hodrick-Prescott filter
with the smoothing parameter equal to 14400.
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Appendix 1:  A First Generation Model of Speculative Attack Against the US Dollar
We use (1)-(3), its foreign counterparts and (7), and let  1
*
1 1 = =a a , 
*
2 2 a a =  to obtain the
following basic relation:
(A1) t t t t t t t t v x y H H p ¢ - + - ¢ - ¢ - ¢ + = ¢ ) ( ) / log( 2 0
* e a a m ,
where a prime denotes the difference between US and foreign values (e.g.,
*
t t t p p p - = ¢ ).
We can also express
(A2) t t t s p h + = ¢ ,
where  ) log( t t e s ”  and  t h  is the deviation from the purchasing power parity.  Letting e  denote
the fixed value of the exchange rate under the gold standard, we set  1 = e  (and thus,
0 ) log( = ” e s ) by choice of units.  With this normalization,  t t p¢ = h  under fixed exchange rates
according to (A2).
Assume that there was a critical ratio f  such that if US gold reserves reached the level
t H f , the US would have left the gold standard and let the dollar float.  Let  t s ~  represent the
shadow value of  t s , which would have materialized if the US lost reserves equal to t t H G f -  at
time t.  Using (A1) and (A2) and letting t t t t s s E x ~ ~
1 - = + , we obtain
(A3) 1 2 2
~ ~ ) 1 ( + - = - t t t t s E R s a a
where
(A4) t t t t t t t t t t t t v y H G G D H D R h e a a m f f - - ¢ - ¢ - ¢ - ¢ + - + + + ” 2 0
* * )] /( ) log[( .
Note that we use the fixed exchange rate (= 1) to convert US gold reserves into foreign reserves
since speculators would have purchased US gold at the pre-float price and then sold it to the rest41
of the world at the foreign price.
Suppose that the stochastic process for  t R  is
(A5) t t t R R x r r + + = -1 1 0 ,
where  t x  is a white noise shock with standard deviation equal to s .  Solving (A3) and (A5), we
get
(A6) t t R s y y r a + - = 0 2
~ ,
where  1 2 2 1 r a a y + - =  .  Note that (A4) and (A6) imply that  t s ~  increases in  t t H G f -  and  t m¢,
and decreases in  t y¢ and  t h .  Let  t p  denote the probability of US devaluation at time t based on
information at time  1 - t .  Using (A5) and (A6), we have
) / ( ) 0 ~ ( 1 y x p t t t t t R E prob s prob - - > = > = , and  ) / ~ ( 1 y x p t t t t t t R E s E x - - > = .
To simplify the estimation of  t R , we ignore shocks to money demand and deviations from
interest parity and let  0 = = ¢ t t v e .  We also assume that gold parities were not expected to change
initially and let 0 = t x  for the initial period 0. Then setting  0 = t  in (A1), we obtain
0 0 0
*
0 0 0 ) / log( p y H H ¢ - ¢ - ¢ + = ¢ m a .  Using this value of  0 a¢ and recalling that  t t p¢ = h under fixed
exchange rates, we can express (A4) as
). ( ) ( ) ( ) / log( )] /( ) log[( 0 0 0
*
0 0
* * p p y y H H H G G D H D R t t t t t t t t t t ¢ - ¢ - ¢ - ¢ - ¢ - ¢ + - - + + + = m m f f
We use this form to estimate  t R .  We integrate our data on  t m¢ D ,  t y¢ D  and  t p¢ D  (letting 1926:6
represent the initial period) to calculate the last three terms on the right hand side of the
expression.42
Our estimation of (A5) yields  004 . 0 = r ,  1 1 = r  and  029 . = s .  Using these values,
setting  . = f 1 2 - = a  initially, we show our estimates of  t t s E ~
1 -  from
1930:1 to 1933:2 in Figure A1.  This figure also shows bands representing margins equal to
s 9 . 2 – . The probability of  t s ~  falling outside these bands is less than .001 if  t x  is distributed
normally.  Up to October 1931, the value of  t t s E ~
1 -  hovers around – .5, a level approximately
50% of the fixed rate s  (equal to zero).  The forecast increases sharply after large gold outflows
in October 1931 and June 1932 but  t p remains extremely low (as the upper band stays much
below s ).
We considered higher-order AR processes for  t R  and different values of  2 a  but these
variations had little effect on our results.  A larger value of s   (e.g., because of the presence of
t v¢ and  t e  shocks) or departures from normal distribution (e.g., fatter tails) could widen the .001
bands but such changes would still not be able to explain significant increases in  t x  for the three
critical months.43
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SENSITIVITY APPENDIX 2
The key results of our sensitivity analysis for the two counterfactuals are summarized in
Tables A1 and A2.  For a number of variations of the basic simulations, the tables show the
lowest levels to which gold reserves and the gold-reserve ratio would have fallen during the
simulation period.
Variations A-C in Table A1 modify the assumptions of the first counterfactual one at a
time: Variation A considers a slower recovery of the money multiplier (from March 1931);
Variation B assumes that French domestic credit policy after September 1931 would not have
changed; and Variation C makes a more conservative assumption about the improvement in the
relative performance of US output and prices.  Variation D combines the unfavorable 
assumptions of variation B and C.  Variation E explores the possibility that the three large
negative residuals would not have been eliminated.  Finally, variation F adjusts H
*
t  according to
the share of UK, France and Germany in the non-US world high-powered money but this
adjustment does not much affect the results of the basic simulation.  The table shows that the
gold-reserve ratio stays well above 50 percent in all cases.
Variations of counterfactual 2 are shown in Table A2.  These variations include the case of
a larger shock in October 1931 (equal to the sum of October 1931 and June 1932 residuals) as
well as the case that combines the larger shock with a more expansionary policy (involving an
additional injection of $300 million).  The possibility that counterfactual 2 would not have
affected any of the three residuals was also examined but this variation (not shown in the table)
produces results similar to Variation B.45
Table A1
Sensitivity Analysis for Counterfactual 1
                                                                          Lowest Simulated Values of
                                                               Gold Reserves Gold-Reserve Ratio
                                                               (mill. US $)                        (%)
Basic Simulation 3834 54.8
(as discussed in the text)
Variation A 3859 55.0
(slower recovery of the money multiplier)
Variation B 3637 53.5
(no change in French policy)
Variation C 3678 53.8
(slower recovery of US economy)
Variation D 3485 52.5
(variations B and C combined)
Variation E 3306 51.1
(three large residuals not eliminated)
Variation F 3533 52.8
(non-US high-powered money adjusted)
Note:  each variation differs from the basic simulation as indicated below.
Variation A: a is set equal to .05 in (14) to determine  m D  from 1931:3.
Variation B: French domestic credit series not adjusted in calculating  D
*
t D .
Variation C:  t p¢ D  and  t y¢ D  equal the average of their actual and simulated values.
Variation D: changes in Variations B and C combined.
Variation E:  t u  is not set equal to zero for 1931:10, 1932:6 and 1933:2.
Variation F:  set H
*
t  equal to 1.66 times the aggregate high-powered money of UK, France and
                     Germany.46
Table A2
Sensitivity Analysis for Counterfactual 2
                                                                          Lowest Simulated Values of
                                                               Gold Reserves Gold-Reserve Ratio
                                                               (mill. US $) (%)
Basic Simulation 3196 42.6
(as discussed in the text)
Variation A 3383 44.0
(constant money multiplier)
Variation B 3060 41.6
(larger shock for October 1931)
Variation C 2892 38.6
(larger shock, more expansionary policy)
Variation D   3165 42.4
(slower recovery of US economy)
Variation E 2859 38.3
(Variations C and D combined)
Variation F 3085 41.8
(non-US high-powered money adjusted)
Note:  each variation differs from the basic simulation as indicated below.
Variation A:  m D is set equal to zero from 1932:1.
Variation B: ut  for 1931:10 set equal to the sum of 1931:10 and 1932:6 residuals.
Variation C: Variation B plus domestic credit increased by $300 million.
Variation D:  t p D and  t y D equal the average of their actual and simulated values.
Variation E: changes in Variations C and D combined.
Variation F: H
*
t  equals 1.66 times the aggregate high-powered money of UK, France and
                    Germany.47
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